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NAFTA Largely Responsible for the Obesity 
Epidemic in Mexico 
Alana D. Siegel

 
INTRODUCTION 
Obesity has notoriously been an American problem.
1
 However, in 
2013, Mexico surpassed the United States to become the most obese 
country in the world.
2
 There are a number of suspected causes for 
Mexico’s rise in the ranks. On a global scale, there is an increased 
availability of obesogenic foods, largely as a result of globalization 
trends such as “McDonaldization” and “Coca-Colonization.”3 In 
 
  J.D. and M.B.A. (2017), Washington University in St. Louis; B.A. (2013), Lafayette 
College.  
 1. John P. Elder, Mexico and the USA: The World’s Leaders in the Obesity Epidemic, 55 
SALUD PUBLICA DE MEXICO S355 (2013) (“[T]he United States until very recently has had the 
highest prevalence of adult obesity internationally (excepting countries with small populations 
such as Belize and Cook Islands).”). See also Adult Obesity Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html (last visited Apr. 13, 
2016) (“More than one-third (34.9% or 78.6 million) of U.S. adults are obese.”); An Epidemic 
of Obesity: U.S. Obesity Trends, HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, http://www.hsph. 
harvard.edu/nutritionsource/an-epidemic-of-obesity/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (discussesing 
the upward trend of the prevalence of obesity in the United States over time). 
 2. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE 2013 STATISTICAL ANNEX 77–78 (2013), available at http://www.fao.org/ 
docrep/018/ i3300e/i3300e.pdf [hereinafter FAO STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE] (showing 
that in 2013, the prevalence of obesity in Mexico’s adult population was 32.8 percent, while the 
United States’ rate was 31.8 percent). See also Dudley Althaus, How Mexico Got So Fat, 
GLOBALPOST (July 8, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/ 
mexico/130705/mexican-fattest-country-obesity (referencing the release of the FAO report). 
 3. See generally GEORGE RITZER, THE MCDONALDIZATION OF SOCIETY 1 (2013) 
(defining ‘McDonaldization’ as “the process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant 
are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the 
world”). See also P. Zimmet, Globalizaiton, Coca-Coloniztion and the Chronic Disease 
Epidemic: Can the Doomsday Scenario Be Averted?, 247 J. INTERNAL MED. 301 (2000) 
(discussing the definition author Arthur Koestler used when he coined the term “Coca-
Colonization”: “[T]he impact of the ways of Western societies on developing countries”); 
Coca-Colonize Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/coca-colonize 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (“[T]o bring a foreign country under the influence of U.S. trade, 
popular culture, and attitudes.”). 
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Mexico’s case, the changing food environment is linked to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
4
 In particular, NAFTA’s 
leniency toward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), defined as “an 
investment by an enterprise from one country into an entity or 
affiliate in another,” acts as a catalyst to bring about these changes.5  
The objectives of NAFTA are clear. Most broadly, the treaty 
expressly reflects the intent of the Canadian, United States, and 
Mexican governments (collectively, the Parties) to eliminate all 
barriers to trade between them.
6
 Another stated objective carries 
equal weight. In implementing NAFTA, the Parties intended to 
“increase substantially investment opportunities” across borders.7 The 
Parties succeeded in this initial effort. Most significantly, the treaty’s 
Chapter Eleven—which details acceptable FDI practices—has 
 
 4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter 
NAFTA]. Despite the fact that NAFTA is a tri-governmental treaty, this Note mainly discusses 
the negative impact NAFTA has had on the spread of non-communicable disease in Mexico, 
and not Canada. This Note argues that the effect of NAFTA’s lax language is more dramatic in 
Mexico due to the differences in the level of development between the United States and 
Mexico at the time NAFTA was enacted, and the impact that difference had in negotiating the 
agreement. Clark et al., Exporting Obesity: US Farm and Trade Policy and the Transformation 
of the Mexican Consumer Food Environment, 18 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 
55 (2012) (noting that NAFTA was the first proposed trade agreement between countries that 
vary so significantly in size and development). See also MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. 
TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: HOW THE DEAL WAS DONE 1 (2003). Cameron and Tomlin 
argue that this dynamic gave the U.S. more bargaining power at the outset of NAFTA 
negotiations. Id. at 18 (“[F]ormal cooperation and the creation of new institutions are very 
difficult tasks when there are great asymmetries of power between two states.”). Looking at the 
GDP of the three countries during the year NAFTA negotiations began, the U.S. economy was 
advanced far beyond that of both Canada and Mexico combined (United States GDP at $6.174 
trillion; Mexico GDP at $314.4 billion; Canada GDP at $608.3 billion). The World Bank data 
function, available at http://data.worldbank.org/country. 
 5. Corinna Hawkes, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the Nutrition Transition, 8 
PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 357, 358 (2004). (“It is well known that FDI (along with trade, 
communication and migration, etc.) has been a key process generating greater global economic 
integration (globalisation)”). Id. at 357–58. 
 6. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 102 (“The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated 
more specifically through its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored 
nation treatment and transparency, are to: a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the 
cross-border movement of, goods and services between the territories of the parties.”). 
 7. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 102 (“The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated 
more specifically through its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored 
nation treatment and transparency, are to: . . . c) increase substantially investment opportunities 
in the territories of the Parties.”). 
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reinforced the power of American transnational corporations by 
increasing their already-global reach.
8
  
While NAFTA acts to stimulate investment and economic gain to 
interested and able investors and investor-corporations,
9
 its effective 
limitation on governments’ ability to regulate has fostered lasting and 
detrimental public health issues in Mexico.
10
 Regulatory limitations 
in NAFTA and its corresponding agreements have already impeded 
some countries’ attempts at public health regulation.11 At the root of 
this is NAFTA’s broad language,12 which provides for extensive 
trade liberalization between the Parties but does not leave much room 
for the Parties to regulate in support of their legitimate governmental 
interests. As this Note will discuss in detail, while there are some 
chapters of NAFTA that authorize restraints on free trade for reasons 
related to human health,
13
 it is unlikely that these carve-outs are 
sufficient enough to adequately combat the spread of non-
communicable diseases such as obesity.
14
  
 
 8. See generally NAFTA, supra note 4, at ch. 11 (Investment) discussed infra Part III. 
 9. Stephen Zamora, Rethinking North America: Why NAFTA’s Laissez Faire Approach 
to Integration Is Flawed, and What to Do About It, 56 VILL. L. REV. 631, 644–45 (2011). 
 10. Alberto R. Salazar, NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic 
Counter-Advertising Law, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31 (2010) (“Trade agreements are 
believed to both facilitate the expansion of the international economy and contribute to national 
growth. Sometimes that comes at the expense of curtailing the ability of governments to 
regulate their economies to achieve national policy goals. This may be the case when, for 
instance, governments promote healthy eating to fight obesity and hunger”). See also Arturu 
Jimenez-Cruz & Monsterrat Bacardi-Gascon, The Fattening Burden of Type 2 Diabetes on 
Mexicans, 27 DIABETES CARE 1213, 1213 (2004) (“[B]etween 1993 and 2000, the prevalence 
of overweight and obesity increased from 55% to 62% among adults”). Currently, more than 
one in three Mexican adults is obese. OECD, OBESITY UPDATE (2014), available at 
http://www.oecd. org/health/Obesity-Update-2014.pdf.  
 11. See discussion about Mexico’s soda tax, Chile’s STOP! attempted legislation and the 
WTO fallback, infra Part IV.  
 12. Zamora, supra note 9, at 632 (“NAFTA’s scope was broad but shallow—it covers 
most of the economic terrain, but it leaves unregulated, or unattended, the geopolitical 
dimensions of North America’s future.”).  
 13. See NAFTA, supra note 4, chs. 7, 9. 
 14. Noncommunicable Diseases, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/ 
fs355/en/ (last updated Jan. 2015) (“Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), also known as chronic 
diseases, are not passed from person to person. They are of long duration and generally slow 
progression.”) This Note primarily focuses on one type of non-communicable disease, obesity. 
The numbers indicating the spread of obesity are startling and the burden is disproportionately 
placed on developing countries. See also Abdesslam Boutayeb, The Double Burden of 
Communicable and Non-Communicable Diseases in Developing Countries, 100 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y TROPICAL MED. HYGIENE 191, 192 (2006) (“If the present trend 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
198 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 50:195 
 
 
This Note attempts to fuse the seemingly opposing interests of 
liberalizing trade and investment with the protection of legitimate 
public health interests. In Part I, this Note details NAFTA and 
provides an overview of the relevant international trade agreements 
that were influential in its implementation. Part II focuses on 
globalization, specifically highlighting the changing food 
demographics and food cultures in the world. This Part also considers 
the extent of the effects of NAFTA’s free trade policy on the obesity 
epidemic in Mexico. Part III contemplates FDI as the most direct 
contributor to the spread of non-communicable diseases in Mexico, 
and highlights some of NAFTA’s provisions that are particularly 
enabling. In Part IV this Note examines NAFTA in detail, exposing 
its limitations and the impact those limitations have on the Parties’ 
ability to adequately intervene in this global public health crisis. 
Lastly, Part V proposes a number of solutions to enable the Parties to 
regulate in the public health sphere, while maintaining NAFTA’s free 
trade objectives.  
I. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
In order to contextualize the implementation of NAFTA and 
understand its impact on the Parties, it is necessary to look back to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
15
 The GATT, 
which originally took effect in 1948, was considered a “provisional 
agreement” of “limited effectiveness” that was instituted to reduce 
tariffs and quotas between participating nations.
16
 The GATT was 
originally signed by 23 countries, including the United States, but 
when it grew to involve 128 nations, the GATT was replaced by the 
 
is maintained, it is predicted that, by 2020, NCDs will account for 80% of the global burden of 
disease, causing seven out of every ten deaths in developing nations . . . .”). 
 15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 
[hereinafter GATT].  
 16. The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WTO.ORG, https://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last accessed Apr. 13, 2016) (“GATT was 
provisional with a limited field of action, but its success over 47 years in promoting and 
securing the liberalization of much of world trade is incontestable”). NAFTA also borrowed 
some provisions from GATT such as the “most-favored nation principle” and “national 
treatment,” discussed infra Part III. 
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World Trade Organization (WTO) in January of 1995.
17
  
The WTO serves as an international forum within which member 
countries can sort out trade relationships with one another.
18
 As an 
intergovernmental organization, the WTO has developed a number of 
agreements that cover a range of topics pertinent to international 
trade, including procedures required in the trade of goods as well as 
dispute settlement procedures.
19
 Together, the WTO (which 
incorporates the GATT) and NAFTA control the trade relationship 
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
20
 
It is against this backdrop that we can start to understand the 
influential role NAFTA has over trade between Mexico and the 
United States. In 1994, Canada, Mexico, and the United States joined 
forces to establish a free trade area through NAFTA.
21
 In doing so, 
the countries came to an agreement that sets restrictions on activities 
with the potential to impede this newly created free trade.
22
 In 
relevant part, the treaty eliminates import and export tariffs and 
 
 17. See GATT, supra note 15. See also The 128 Countries That Had Signed GATT by 
1994, WTO.ORG, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (last accessed Apr. 13, 
2016). The WTO incorporated the GATT as amended in 1994 at the Uruguay Round 
Agreement, an eight-year series of trade negotiations that led to the formation of the WTO. See 
generally THE WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, 
WTO available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/agrmntseries2_gatt_e.pdf (last 
accessed Apr. 13, 2016). Hereinafter, any reference to “WTO” intends to include pre-1995 
GATT unless otherwise mentioned. 
 18. Who We Are, WTO.ORG, available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last accessed Apr. 13, 2016).  
 19. See generally WTO Legal Texts, WTO.ORG, available at https://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last accessed Mar. 30, 2016). These agreements developed 
as a result of the Uruguay Round.  
 20. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 103 (indicating where NAFTA stands in relation to 
other agreements: even when NAFTA applies, Parties maintain their rights under GATT; when 
NAFTA conflicts with another law, NAFTA trumps). See also MAURY E. BREDAHL & ERIN 
HOLLERAN, TECHNICAL REGULATIONS AND FOOD SAFETY IN NAFTA 74 (1997), available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/16906/1/ag970071.pdf (“The NAFTA and WTO 
Agreements together govern the trade relationship between the United States, Canada and 
Mexico. The important difference between NAFTA and WTO, as Hooker and Caswell note, is 
that the WTO has ‘institutional arrangements for binding arbitration of differences between 
countries on safety regulation.’”).  
 21. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 101 (“The Parties to this Agreement, consistent with 
Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, hereby establish a free trade 
area.”). 
 22. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 101.  
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incentivizes cross-border investment.
23
 To balance these trade 
liberalizations, NAFTA provides the Parties with guidelines on how 
to regulate on a national level within the confines of the treaty, and 
provides a procedure to settle disputes.
24
 Unfortunately, however, 
many of these provisions are overbroad and provide the Parties with 
little clarity about acceptable actions—and importantly—the outer 
limits of acceptable regulatory action.
25
 
The interaction between NAFTA and the WTO agreements only 
adds to this ambiguity. NAFTA’s Article 103 first sets forth the 
nebulous relationship: “The Parties affirm their existing rights and 
obligations . . . under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(now WTO) and other agreements to which such Parties are party,”26 
and it subsequently empowers NAFTA to hold in the case of any 
inconsistency between NAFTA and these other agreements.
27
 In large 
part, NAFTA mirrors many of the fundamental aspects of WTO 
agreements. In addition, some NAFTA chapters even expressly defer 
to GATT for authority.
28
 For example, pursuant to NAFTA’s Chapter 
Nine, member countries “affirm with respect to each other their 
existing rights and obligations relating to standards-related measures 
under the [WTO] Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.”29 
 
 23. See generally NAFTA, supra note 4, chs. 1, 11.  
 24. See generally NAFTA, supra note 4, chs. 7, 9 (allowing for measures to protect 
human health), ch. 11 (setting forth procedures for investment-related disputes) and ch. 20 
(setting forth procedures for other disputes).  
 25. See generally Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbital Precedent: Dream, Necessity or 
Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT’L (2007) (discussing how the absence of precedent in international 
arbitration leads to unpredictable outcomes). See also Anthony DePalma, NAFTA’s Powerful 
Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-
obscure-tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html?pagewanted=all (“The lack of a traditional 
appeal process, transparency and legally binding precedent, along with the wide scope of what 
can be challenged under the free-trade investment rules, have made people wary in all three 
nations, including government officials.”). 
 26. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 103(1). As we will see in Chapter Nine discussed infra Part 
IV, NAFTA defers to GATT’s international standards.  
 27. NAFTA, supra note 4,  art. 103(2) (“In the event of any inconsistency between this 
Agreement and such other agreements, this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement”) (emphasis added).  
 28. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 903 (abiding by GATT Technical Barriers to 
Trade). 
 29. NAFTA, supra note 4, at ch. 9. See also GATT, supra note 15. Confusingly, NAFTA 
authors restated this deference to GATT in Chapter Nine, despite already stating in Article 103 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016]  NAFTA Largely Responsible for Obesity in Mexico 201 
 
 
Because it is not readily clear when these agreements overlap, and 
when they do, which takes precedent, the Parties are forced into 
regulatory guesswork, potentially opening them up to a NAFTA suit 
down the line. As a result, because this ambiguity makes regulation 
and policy-making more difficult, the effect is essentially uncapped 
power for investors.   
 
of Chapter One that the parties’ reaffirm their obligations under GATT. While Article 103 itself 
may not be confusing, it is not always clear how this provision interacts with references to other 
agreements.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
202 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 50:195 
 
 
II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE “NUTRITION TRANSITION” 
Global food norms are shifting as a result of globalization. Health 
scholars call this trend the “Nutrition Transition,” defined as the 
“dual process of dietary convergence towards processed food 
consumption and dietary adaptation to a wider range of processed 
foods targeted at different niche markets.”30 Put simply, as global 
food systems change, an increasing number of individuals and entire 
populations are consuming unhealthy “Western diets,”31 which 
include an increased amount of animal products, vegetable oils, 
sweeteners, and processed foods.
32
  
In a pre-NAFTA North America, Mexico spent approximately 
 
 30. Corinna Hawkes, Uneven Dietary Development: Linking the Policies and Processes of 
Globalization with the Nutrition Transition, Obesity, and Diet-Related Chronic Illnesses, 2:4 
GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 1, 2–3 (2006). Hawkes also discusses an important finding on 
global market integration: “[G]lobal market integration facilitates not only convergence in 
consumption habits (as is commonly assumed in the ‘Coca-Colonization’ hypothesis), but 
adaptation to products targeted at different niche markets.” Id. at 1. See discussion of integrated 
global markets as a result of lax FDI regulations infra Part III. The “convergence” Hawkes 
describes is characterized by “an increased reliance on a narrow base of staple grains, and 
increased consumption of meat and meat products, dairy products, edible oil, salt and sugar, and 
a lower take of dietary fiber.” Id. at 2–3. Hawkes defines dietary adaptation as the “increased 
consumption of brand-name processed and store-bought food, an increased number of meals 
eaten outside the home, and consumer behaviors driven by the appeal of new foods available.” 
Id. See also The Nutrition Transition and Obesity, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.fao.org/focus/e/obesity/obes2.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (describing the obesity 
in the developing world as a result of the “nutrition transition,” “a series of changes in diet, 
physical activity, health, and nutrition”) [hereinafter FAO]. 
 31. BM Popkin & P. Gordon-Larsen, The Nutrition Transition: Worldwide Obesity 
Dynamics and Their Determinants, 28 INT’L J. OBESITY 52, 52 (2004) (“Modern societies seem 
to be converging on a diet high in saturated fats, sugar, and refined foods but low in fiber—
often termed the ‘Western diet.’”). See also FAO, supra note 30 (“Another element of the 
nutrition transition is the increasing importation of foods from the industrialized world. As a 
result, traditional diets featuring grains and vegetables are giving way to meals high in fat and 
sugar.”). 
32. GINA KENNEDY ET AL., FAO, GLOBALIZATION OF FOOD SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: A SYNTHESIS OF COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 124 (2004), available at 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-y5736e.pdf (“Globalization is having a major impact on food systems 
around the world. It is affecting availability and access to food through changes to food 
production, procurement, and distribution, in turn bringing about a gradual shift in food culture, 
with consequent changes in dietary consumption patterns and nutritional status that vary with 
the socio-economic strata.”). See also Hawkes, supra note 30 at 1 (“In a nutrition transition, the 
consumption of foods high in fats and sweeteners is increasing throughout the developing 
world.”).  
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$1.8 billion per year on food imports.
33
 As of 2011, post-NAFTA 
Mexico spends about $24 billion per year on food imports.
34
 
Unsurprisingly, a large number of these United States-to-Mexico 
exports are of obesogenic foods and other “unhealthy 
commodities.”35 For example, post-NAFTA exports to Mexico from 
the United States of high fructose corn syrup—a highly caloric 
sweetener linked to obesity
36—are up by a factor of 863.37 The 
impact on the health of Mexican citizens is tangible and costly.
38
 
While there are a number of suspected causes that contribute to this 
pandemic, in Mexico, NAFTA’s lenient FDI provisions are at fault.  
III. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AS THE VECTOR TO THE SPREAD 
OF NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASE 
A. FDI Overview 
FDI comes in many flavors. For the purposes of this Note, FDI is 
the process by which an enterprise in one country makes a long-term 
 
 33. Laura Carlsen, NAFTA Is Starving Mexico, CIP AMERICAS PROGRAM (Oct. 20, 2011), 
http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/5617. 
 34. Carlsen, supra note 33.  
 35. David Stuckler et al., Manufacturing Epidemics: The Role of Global Producers in 
Increased Consumption of Unhealthy Commodities Including Processed Foods, Alcohol, and 
Tobacco, 9:6 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (2012) (“‘Unhealthy commodities’—soft drinks and processed 
foods that are high in salt, fat, and sugar, as well as tobacco and alcohol—are leading risk 
factors for chronic non-communicable diseases.”). The number of these exports has increased 
dramatically. See generally Clark et al., supra note 4. See also Bolling et al., U.S. Firms Invest 
in Mexico’s Processed Food Industry, 22 FOODREVIEW 26 (1999) (“U.S. exports of processed 
foods to Mexico, mostly processed meats, poultry, animal fats, and vegetable oil, increased 
from $1.1 billion in 1990 to $2.8 billion in 1998”); U.S.-Mexico Trade Facts, U.S. OFFICE 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/mexico# (last accessed 
May 26, 2016) (noting that in 2013, obesogenic exports to Mexico amounted to $1.8 billion in 
corn, $1.5 billion in soybeans, $1.4 billion in dairy products, $1.2 billion in pork and pork 
products, and $1.2 billion in poultry meat). 
 36. Miriam Bocarsly et al., High-Fructose Corn Syrup Causes Characteristics of Obesity 
in Rats: Increased Body Weight, Body Fat, and Triglyceride Levels, 97 PHARMACOLOGY, 
BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAVIOR 101, 101 (2010). 
 37. Tracie McMillan, How NAFTA Changed American (and Mexican) Food Forever, 
NPR (Feb 13, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/02/13/385754265/how-nafta-
changed-american-and-mexican-food-forever. 
 38. See, e.g., Elder, supra note 1, at S355; FAO STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, 
supra note 2. 
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investment in a foreign enterprise by acquisition.
39
 Through this 
transaction, the investor-enterprise becomes a foreign affiliate and 
transnational parent to the foreign enterprise.
40
 When compared to 
other forms of international investment, FDI is unique in that the 
investor maintains a level of control in management and decision-
making in the investment.
41
 
Firms are incentivized to invest in activities abroad for a number 
of reasons, employing both supply-side and demand-side strategies.
42
 
On the supply side, firms benefit from FDI in places where they can 
use subsidiaries to realize economies of scale.
43
 On the demand side, 
firms are able to expand their brands internationally by tapping 
previously untapped and otherwise hard-to-reach markets.
44
 Mexico, 
for example, is a prime candidate for FDI, as it has an attractive 116 
million consumers with an aggregate purchasing power of over one 
trillion dollars.
45
  
On one hand, countries are receptive to FDI because of its 
reputation of boosting economic development.
46
 As a general matter, 
FDI flows from industrialized countries to developing countries, 
 
 39. RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW: 
MULTILATERAL, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL GOVERNANCE 168 (2010). See also IMAD A. 
MOOSA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 7 (2002); Hawkes, 
supra note 5, at 358. 
 40. MOOSA, supra note 39, at 8 (“A foreign affiliate is defined as ‘an incorporated or 
unincorporated enterprise in which an investor, who is resident in another economy, owns a 
stake that permits a lasting interest in the management of that enterprise’”). See also LEAL-
ARCAS, supra note 39.  
 41. LEAL-ARCAS, supra note 39, at 169–70. Other types of FDI can occur by creating a 
company, joint-venture, or by way of financing. Id.  
 42. Id. at 171 (“FDIs may be motivated either by demand factors that reflect the 
attractiveness of the host-country, or by the characteristics of supply of the investors’ country”). 
See also Hawkes, supra note 5, at 357. 
 43. MOOSA, supra note 39, at 74 (“In general, it seems that FDI can exert an impact on 
the output of the host country if it is possible to absorb surplus resources and/or improve 
efficiency through alternative allocations”). 
 44. Hawkes, supra note 5, at 360. 
 45. NAFTA at Twenty: Accomplishments, Challenges, and the Way Forward: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong. 9 
(2014) (the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House of Representatives 
gathered to have a hearing to evaluate NAFTA twenty years after its implementation). 
 46. MOOSA, supra note 39, at 73 (“FDI, by affecting capital accumulation, ought to be 
capable of influencing economic development.”). See generally Lawrence Haddad, Redirecting 
the Nutrition Transition: What Can Food Policy Do?, 21 DEVELOPMENT POL’Y REV. 599 
(2003).  
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thereby bringing about important changes in technology and 
productivity levels beyond what would occur organically by way of 
domestic investment.
47
 On the other hand, despite these upsides to 
international investors, FDI has a number of negative impacts on the 
host country.
48
 Because of the economies of scale achieved by 
investors, local producers often struggle to compete and must 
eventually surrender to international corporate giants.
49
 In Mexico, 
small farmers have even joined forces to push for a re-negotiation of 
the treaty.
50
 NAFTA’s provisions that enable FDI contribute to the 
pervasive obesity epidemic in Mexico, by introducing and increasing 
the availability of processed and other obesogenic foods. This Part 
will assess the sections of NAFTA that are especially enabling to 
FDI. 
B. NAFTA Chapter One: Objectives 
NAFTA’s first chapter states the objectives of the treaty, which 
include the Parties’ desire “to eliminate barriers to trade in, and 
facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services between 
the territories of the Parties,” and “to increase substantially 
investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties.”51 NAFTA 
has done just that. Economic studies suggest that NAFTA is 
responsible for a 40 to 70 percent increase in FDI.
52
 In the food and 
beverage industries alone, US investment into Mexico grew from 
 
 47. MOOSA, supra note 39, at 75. See also LEAL-ARCAS, supra note 39, at 179 (“The 
main arguments in favor of FDI in developing countries are: immediate capital formation, 
creation of new employment, upgrading of infrastructure facilities, and transfer of skills in 
technology and management.”). 
 48. LEAL-ARCAS, supra note 39, at 178 (“Developing countries have a number of fears 
that prevent them from accepting any kind of negotiations on FDI in a multilateral organization. 
Among these fears is the possible reduction of their room for maneuver in domestic policies.”). 
 49. See e.g., Clark et al., supra note 4, at 57 (describing the negative impact free trade has 
had on white corn production in Mexico). See also, LEAL-ARCAS, supra note 39, at 229 
(“NAFTA’s agricultural provisions have been so extreme that Mexican family farmers are 
demanding a re-negotiation or nullification of the treaty, after its first phase of initial 
implementation led to the displacement of millions of Mexican farmers.”). 
 50. Carlsen, supra note 33. 
 51. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 101. 
 52. ALFREDO CUERVAS, CHANGES IN THE PATTERNS OF EXTERNAL FINANCING IN 
MEXICO SINCE THE APPROVAL OF NAFTA 24 (July 2002). 
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$2.3 billion in 1993 to $8.7 billion in 2007.
53
 
While the treaty’s broad objectives are meant to be tailored by its 
principles and rules,
54
 as discussed infra, functionally there are few 
limitations on this expansive text. These boundless objectives are at 
the root of the negative impacts of NAFTA’s extensive trade 
liberalization.  
C. NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Investment and Investor-State Disputes 
NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven is highly criticized for favoring 
investor interests above all.
55
 Most significantly, NAFTA is the only 
multilateral trade agreement with such expansive protections for 
private investors.
56
 Scholars point to a few Chapter Eleven provisions 
that were instrumental in spurring the significant growth in United 
States’ FDI between 1993 and 2009.57 Three provisions in particular 
 
 53. NAFTA, Canada & Mexico: Mexico Trade & FDI, USDA (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/countries-regions/nafta,-canada-mexico/ 
mexico-trade-fdi.aspx. 
 54. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 102 (“The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated 
more specifically through its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-
nation treatment and transparency, are to: (a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the 
cross-border movement of, goods and services between the territories of the Parties; 
(b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; (c) increase substantially 
investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; (d) provide adequate and effective 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each Party’s territory; (e) create 
effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agreement, for its joint 
administration and for the resolution of disputes; and (f) establish a framework for further 
trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this 
Agreement”). 
 55. NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 135 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004) (“Environmentalists, labor organizers and 
human rights advocates all decry the secrecy, potential disruptiveness to ordinary lawmaking, 
and placing of investors’ interests before those of the broader public.”) [hereinafter NAFTA 
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION]. See also LEAL-ARCAS, supra note 39, at 229 (“NAFTA 
represents the gold standard of corporate rights in trade and investment agreements because it 
includes hitherto unheard of corporate privileges, including investor-to-state dispute 
resolutions.”); DePalma, supra note 25 (describing the popular impression of the investor-state 
dispute mechanism as a “secret government”). 
 56. Chris Tollefson, Games Without Fronteirs: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions 
Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 143 (2002). 
 57. IMITIAZ HUSSAIN, REEVALUATING NAFTA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 36–37 (2012). 
Just fifteen years after NAFTA was instituted, the total FDI tripled, amounting to $138 billion. 
Id. See also NAFTA, supra note 4, at ch. 11 (fostering a favorable investment environment 
abroad). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016]  NAFTA Largely Responsible for Obesity in Mexico 207 
 
 
are most relevant to the United States’ FDI into Mexico’s processed 
food industry.  
Article 1102 affords “national treatment” to each of the 
participating countries.
58
 The article sets forth that “each Party shall 
accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than 
it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors.”59 This same 
section is repeated with regard to national treatment for 
investments.
60
 For clarity purposes, NAFTA expressly states that no 
Party may “impose on an investor of another Party a requirement that 
a minimum level of equity . . . be held,”61 or “require an investor of 
another Party . . . to sell or otherwise dispose of an investment.”62 As 
discussed herein, when these issues are brought to the attention of a 
NAFTA tribunal, panelists deciding on an Article 1102 claim must 
first determine how a measure has impacted an investor/investment in 
order to later adjudicate whether or not one party received more 
favorable treatment.
63
 
The Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle of Article 1103 is 
similar in effect to national treatment and was created to preserve 
NAFTA’s principles in case of subsequent international 
agreements.
64
 In short, MFN requires that all North American 
investors be treated the same.
65
 Together, Articles 1102 and 1103 
 
 58. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1102 (designating national treatment status to investors). 
See also HUSSAIN, supra note 57, at 136–37. NAFTA also borrowed the concept of “National 
Treatment” from GATT. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 301. National Treatment necessitates the 
absence of discrimination in both taxes and regulations between domestic and foreign goods. Id. 
 59. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1102(1). 
 60. Id. art. 1102(2) (“Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of its own 
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.”).  
 61. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1102(4)(a). 
 62. Id. art. 1102(4)(b). 
 63. NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra note 55, at 29 (“The test is 
whether any relevant competitor is receiving more favorable treatment than the claiming 
investor or its investment.”). Id.  
 64. HUSSAIN, supra note 57, at 36. See also Timothy Hughes, NAFTA Tribunal Considers 
Issues of Res Judicata and Customary International Law Minimum Standard of Treatment, 
HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS ARBITRATION NOTES (Nov. 14, 2014), http://hsfnotes. 
com/arbitration/2014/11/14/nafta-tribunal-considers-issues-of-res-judicata-and-the-customary-
international-law-minimum-standard-of-treatment/. 
 65. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1103 (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment). See also LEON 
TRAKMAN & NICOLA RANIERI, REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 104–
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make it clear that regardless of whether a measure appears 
discriminatory on its face (de jure discrimination) or if it is 
discriminatory in its application (de facto discrimination), it can be 
considered a barrier to trade.
66
 Put simply, irrespective of the Parties’ 
legitimate intentions in adopting trade-restrictive measures, the fact 
that a particular measure in its effect is more trade-restrictive to 
international investors is enough to violate NAFTA.
67
  
Article 1105 mandates minimum standards of treatment.
68
 This 
section provides that other Parties’ investments be treated “in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security.”69 This section acts as an 
affirmative duty on the Parties to treat investments of other Parties at 
a designated floor level.
70
 Because Article 1105 requires the Tribunal 
to judge in accordance with international law, this section affords the 
panel members with expansive authority to determine what is fair and 
equitable under the treaty.
71
  
Issues that arise between Parties or between Investors and Parties 
are settled pursuant to Chapter Eleven’s special rules on investor-
state disputes.
72
 Article 1115 provides the mechanism for investors to 
 
05 (2013) (detailing what is required under most-favored-nation treatment).  
 66. See generally HUSSAIN, supra note 57.  
 67. Tollefson, supra note 56, at 154. 
 68. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment). See also 
HUSSAIN, supra note 57, at 38 (explaining that the United States and Canada developed the 
minimum standard of performance provision to protect their developed economies from 
developing economies, like Mexico’s at the time). The Minimum Standard of Treatment 
“established a performance floor to compensate for the developed-developing gaps in 
production and costs.” Id.  
 69. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1105(1). Any measures adopted by a Party must also be 
non-discriminatory to other Parties. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1105(2) (“Without prejudice to 
paragraph 1 and notwithstanding Article 1108(7)(b), each Party shall accord to investors of 
another Party, and to investments of investors of another Party, non-discriminatory treatment 
with respect to measures it adopts or maintains relating to losses suffered by investments in its 
territory owing to armed conflict or civil strife.”).  
 70. Tollefson, supra note 56, at 155. 
 71. Todd Weiler, NAFTA Chapter 11 Jurisprudence: Coming Along Nicely, 9 SW. J.L. & 
TRADE AMERICAS 257 (2003). See also Tollefson, supra note 56, at 155. 
 72. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1115. Prior to NAFTA, trade agreements only permitted 
governments to enforce agreements on other governments. Schaffer et al., Global Trade and 
Public Health, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 23, 27 (2005). Today, corporations can sue to enforce 
this international treaty for loss of current or future profits, even if the alleged loss of profits is 
caused by governmental regulation to protect human health. Id.  
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bring a NAFTA claim; investor-state disputes are not subject to 
NAFTA’s other dispute settlement chapter.73 Under Article 1116, 
investors may sue a Party alleging an injury to itself, and under 
Article 1117, investors are given the power to bring a NAFTA claim 
on behalf of an enterprise.
74
 
Under Article 1120(2), the NAFTA tribunal is granted broad 
discretion to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over a 
particular claim.
75
 The arbitration committee consists of three 
arbitrators, one appointed by each of the disputing Parties, and the 
third appointed by agreement of the disputing Parties.
76
 Unlike the 
rules of interpretation that most international tribunals are subject to, 
in accord with the Vienna Convention—which requires tribunals to 
attend to the plain meaning of the text—the NAFTA tribunal is 
granted broad authority to interpret text in light of NAFTA’s 
objectives.
77
 This authority is problematic. Because NAFTA’s 
objectives are broad and terms that are critical to the effect of the 
document remain undefined or unclear, there is little predictability for 
the Parties as to how they will fare in the dispute process.  
While there have only been a few cases adjudicated by the 
NAFTA tribunal, some are especially notable. In Cargill, Inc. v. 
 
 73. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1115 (“[T]his Section establishes a mechanism for the 
settlement of investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among investors of the 
Parties in accordance with the principle of international reciprocity and due process before an 
impartial tribunal.”).  
 74. Id. arts. 1116, 1117 (Article 1116: Claim by an Investor of a Party on Its Own Behalf; 
Article 1117: Claim by an Investor of a Party on Behalf of an Enterprise). 
 75. Id. art. 1120(2) (“The applicable arbitration rules shall govern the arbitration except to 
extent modified by this Section.”). See also Weiler, supra note 71 at 251. (“All arbitral rules 
made available to investors under NAFTA Article 1120 contain a provision which vests the 
tribunal with the authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute before it. 
NAFTA does not modify this power. Therefore, under Article 1102(2) the tribunal’s discretion 
to decide whether it has jurisdiction to hear a claim is untrammeled.”).  
 76. See generally NAFTA, supra note 4, ch. 7. 
 77. NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra note 55, at 110 (“Article 31(1) 
of the Vienna Convention provides the golden rule of treaty interpretation. It requires a tribunal 
to focus on the plain meaning of the text before it while being mindful not only of its placement 
within the context of the treaty but also of the objects and purposes of the treaty.”). NAFTA 
provides a list of objectives in Article 102 and a prescription for how the tribunal must interpret 
the text. See generally NAFTA, supra note 4, ch 1. It follows that when interpreting the text, 
the tribunal considers NAFTA’s broad objectives including the promotion of conditions of fair 
competition in the free trade area, elimination of barriers to trade, and the promotion of 
increased investment opportunities. Id.  
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United Mexican States, Cargill, Inc. of the United States sued the 
Mexican government on behalf of its subsidiary Cargill de Mexico, a 
seller of high fructose corn syrup.
78
 The suit came after Mexico 
attempted to place a 20 percent tax on the production and sale of soft 
drinks that contained high fructose corn syrup, a measure which 
Cargill claimed—and the NAFTA tribunal affirmed79—was in 
violation of Article 1102, National Treatment.
80
 As a result, the 
Mexican government was forced to fork over more than $77 
million.
81
 Similarly, as a result of the same tax, in Corn Products 
International v. United Mexican States, Corn Products, Inc. a U.S. 
corporation in the business of high fructose corn syrup production 
sued on behalf of its Mexican subsidiary Arancia CP.
82
 Corn Products 
claimed this tax would cause its suppliers to drop its product, 
effectively destroying the market.
83
 The tribunal again decided 
against Mexico and awarded Corn Products International $58.4 
million.
84
  
These decisions make it clear that the investor-state dispute 
resolution mechanism of Chapter Eleven favors investors, which in 
turn facilitates FDI. By granting investors power to bring a NAFTA 
claim on behalf of themselves or a corporate entity, investors are 
sufficiently incentivized to challenge Parties’ regulatory measures. 
This is more likely to be true in the obesity context. As discussed 
further in Part IV, regulation against risk factors of non-
communicable diseases is especially likely to be difficult under the 
 
 78. Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (Sept. 
18, 2009). 
 79. Cargill, ¶ 189 (noting the requirements for a successful claim to be brought under 
section 1102: the foreign investor/investment be in like circumstances with domestic 
investors/investments, and the treatment of the foreign investor/investment is less favorable 
than the domestic investor/investment). 
 80. Cargill, ¶ 2 (“Specifically, the Tribunal holds that Respondent violated Article 1102 in 
that Cargill de Mexico was in ‘like circumstances’ with domestic suppliers of cane sugar to the 
soft drink industry and that the treatment accorded to it was less favourable than the treatment 
accorded to domestic investors or their investments.”). 
 81. Cargill, ¶ 5. See also id. ¶¶ 431–540 (discussing the damage determination). 
 82. Corn Prods. Int’l v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/1, Award 
(Aug. 18, 2009).  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. See also Hillary Russ, Mexico Pays Corn Products $58M NAFTA Award, LAW360 
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/222117/mexico-pays-corn-products-58m-
nafta-award.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016]  NAFTA Largely Responsible for Obesity in Mexico 211 
 
 
current NAFTA regime. 
D. United States FDI in Mexico: Transnational Corporations 
The term transnational corporation (TNC) is an umbrella term 
generally used to describe international conglomerates that were 
started in one country, but have expanded operations 
internationally.
85
 Examples include Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, 
PepsiCo, and Yum! Brands.
86
 
Prior to NAFTA’s implementation, around 1987, the Mexican 
government reformed a restrictive FDI barrier, which previously 
limited the amount of equity a foreign investor could hold in a 
Mexican company to 49 percent.
87
 The reform eliminated the 
minority ownership restriction and subsequently, international 
investment increased (Mexican FDI Reform).
88
 Since NAFTA’s 
inception, transnational corporations have been inclined to enter 
emerging markets like Mexico.
89
 
TNCs are likely to invest, as they historically have demonstrated a 
way to reach previously-untapped markets.
90
 Lenient regulations 
enable large TNCs to lower prices, open up new purchasing channels, 
optimize the effectiveness of marketing and advertising, and 
ultimately increase profits for their companies.
91
 This type of growth 
is typically available to a US corporation that purchases an existing 
market leader, which can then capitalize on already-existing branding 
and marketing techniques in a foreign market and expand its products 
 
 85. See “TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION,” WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OR AMERICAN LAW 
(2008). See also MOOSA, supra note 39, at 6 (discussion about multinational corporations). 
 86. See generally MOOSA, supra note 39 at 6 (list of widely-known multinational 
corporations). See, e.g., Global Divisions, PEPSICO, http://www.pepsico.com/company/global-
divisions (last accessed Apr. 16, 2016); Our Company: The Coca-Cola System, COCA-COLA, 
http://www.coca-colacompany.com/our-company/the-coca-cola-system/ (last accessed Apr. 16, 
2016); Discover McDonalds, MCDONALD’S, http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/country/ 
map.html (last accessed Apr. 16, 2016); and Yum! Brands Feed The World, YUM! BRANDS (last 
viewed Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.yum.com/brands/. 
 87. HUSSAIN, supra note 57, at 36. 
 88. Id. 
 89. LEAL-ARCAS, supra note 39, at 170–75 (economic analysis of FDI). See also Hawkes, 
supra note 5, at 360 (discussing economic incentives for corporations to have operations 
abroad). 
 90. Hawkes, supra note 5, at 360.  
 91. LEAL-ARCAS, supra note 39, at 170–75.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 50:195 
 
 
to a larger consumer base.
92
 The TNC is subsequently able to retain 
the existing consumer base and marketing techniques of the former 
Mexican firm, while simultaneously crushing competition from local 
firms.
93
 Transnational corporations also benefit from intangibles such 
as access to knowledge possessed by local companies regarding local 
market conditions and consumer preferences.
94
  
E. U.S. FDI in Mexico: Processed Food and Drinks 
In the processed food and drink industries, the impact of NAFTA 
is clear. In 1987, before NAFTA was enacted, the United States’ FDI 
in the processed food industry amounted to a mere $210 million; by 
1997, that number rose to $5 billion.
95
 The Mexican FDI Reform 
facilitated transnational food and drink corporations’ ability to 
capitalize on efficiencies arising out of economies of scale by 
investing in foreign manufacturing facilities for their processed food 
products.
96
 By directly investing in Mexican manufacturing facilities, 
these corporations are able to save on wages, taxes, and other 
operational costs, thereby increasing profits.
97
  
Further, direct investment by food and drink TNCs increases the 
presence of each brand, aiding the Nutrition Transition by increasing 
the availability—and thereby impacting desirability—of obesogenic 
food and drinks.
98
 At present, Mexico is presently the world’s third-
largest receiver of U.S. FDI in the processed food and beverage 
industry.
99
  
The sugary drink industry experienced a huge boom in the wake 
 
 92. Hawkes, supra note 5, at 360. Investing in many national markets allows transnational 
food corporations to benefit from economies of scale in marketing and advertising. Id.  
 93. Id. at 360–61.  
 94. Id. at 360. 
 95. Bolling, supra note 35. 
 96. Hawkes, supra note 5, at 360L65.  
 97. See, e.g., Mike Esterl & John Revill, PepsiCo, Nestlé to Invest in Mexico, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 24, 2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304632204579340 
471417509380?mg=id-wsj.  
 98. Hawkes, supra note 5, at 362.  
 99. Economic Research Service, Mexico Trade & FDI, USDA (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/countries-regions/nafta,-canada-mexico/ 
mexico-trade-fdi.aspx. Seventy-five percent of United States FDI is in companies that produce 
highly processed foods, such as meat, poultry, and snack foods. Bolling, supra note 35, at 26.  
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of NAFTA. One example highlighting this surge concerns the 
incredible increase in the amount of Coca-Cola Company beverage 
products imbibed over the course of the NAFTA period.
100
 Just 
before NAFTA, in 1991, each person on average in Mexico 
consumed approximately 290 eight-ounce servings of Coca-Cola 
beverage products.
101
 By 2002, this number nearly doubled, growing 
to 486 servings per person.
102
 In 2013, as NAFTA approached its 
twentieth anniversary, this number increased yet again to 745 
servings.
103
 For frame of reference, this number significantly 
surpasses the United States’ average intake of regular Coca-Cola, 
which has hovered around 401 servings per person per year.
104
  
The snack market was similarly affected.
105
 Entities from the 
United States have more than a 98 percent share of Mexico’s import 
market for snack foods.
106
 According to PepsiCo, “even if the per 
capita consumption rate of salty snacks for Brazil, India or China is 
doubled, their consumption levels will be far below those of 
Mexico.”107 PepsiCo has even announced plans to invest $5 billion 
into its subsidiary Latin American Foods to continue growing within 
the rapidly emerging Mexican salty snacks market.
108
 This suggests 
the trend of FDI expansion into Mexico is still relevant.  
 
 100. PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF COMPANY BEVERAGE PRODUCTS, COCA-COLA (2012), 
available at https://www.coca-colacompany.com/annual-review/2011/pdf/2011-per-capita-
consumption.pdf [hereinafter PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION].  
 101. Id. In the United States, consumption rates were nearly identical to those in Mexico, at 
292 servings per person per year. Id.  
 102. Id. In the United States, consumption rates were at 407 servings per person per year. 
Id.  
 103. Id  
 104. PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION, supra note 100.  
 105. Hawkes, supra note 5, at 360 (in discussing the presence of FDI in the food 
processing industry, “Mexico, for example, attracted US $5 billion of FDI in food processing 
from the USA in 1998, a 25-fold increase from US $210 million in 1987”). 
 106. DONALD A. HODGEN, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SNACK FOODS—2003 (2004), 
available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ocg/snacks03.pdf.  
 107. Trefis Team, A Look at Sabritas as PepsiCo Steps Up Investment in Mexico, FORBES 
(Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/02/05/a-look-at-sabritas-as-
pepsico-steps-up-investment-in-mexico/. 
 108. PepsiCo Plans to Invest $5 Billion in Mexico Over Next 5 Years as Part of Push into 
‘Emerging Markets’, FOX NEWS LATINO (Jan. 28, 2014), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/ 
money/2014/01/28/pepsico-plans-to-invest-5-billion-in-mexico-over-next-5-years-as-part-push-
into/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2016) (“PepsiCo has invested aggressively over the last few years in 
emerging markets—calling Mexico ‘one of the most attractive markets in Latin America.’”). 
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IV. NAFTA’S LIMITS ON GOVERNMENTAL REGULATORY ABILITY 
NAFTA clearly facilitated FDI, which in turn provided real 
economic benefits for investors.
109
 Unfortunately though, the same 
agreement that enabled FDI inhibits the Parties’ ability to effectively 
regulate against the threat of non-communicable diseases.
110
 In short, 
much of NAFTA’s language is ambiguous. The ambiguity 
contributes too much of the Parties’ regulatory guesswork, as 
governments struggle to decipher the text and construct regulatory or 
policy measures that can be implemented within the confines of the 
treaty. This, in turn, lends great deference to the panel members 
responsible for interpreting the text in the event of a dispute.
111
 This 
Part will provide an overview of the central NAFTA ambiguities that 
perpetuate the treaty’s breadth.   
 
 109. See, e.g., Hawkes, supra note 5; Bolling, supra note 35. 
 110. NAFTA, supra note 4, chs. 7, 9.  
 111. Devin Odell NAFTA’s Threat to Domestic Health and Environmental Laws, 17 
ENVIRONS 1 (1993), available at http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/volumes/17/1/odell.pdf (“In 
other words, the panel may essentially substitute their own judgment for that of voters or 
legislature as to the best way to achieve food safety goals.”).  
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A. “Barrier to Trade” 
Despite the treaty’s first stated objective, “to eliminate barriers to 
trade,”112 the text does not include an explicit definition for the 
important term, “barrier to trade.” However, the treaty does broadly 
distinguish between tariff and nontariff barriers to trade.
113
 Tariff 
barriers are as they appear—a tax imposed by one government on the 
import or export of goods.
114
 Alternatively, nontariff barriers are 
more non-descript. These can include regulations, policy, or other 
measures that have the effect of restricting international trade.
115
 This 
Note focuses on the implications of a hazy definition of what 
amounts to a nontariff barrier to trade, specifically in the context of 
Parties’ ability to regulate in order to protect the public health 
interests of their nations.  
Unsurprisingly, Tribunals must regularly determine whether a 
Party’s action amounts to a barrier to trade. Without sufficient 
understanding of how the Tribunal will interpret this key term, 
Parties are forced to hedge their bets when determining whether or 
not a particular regulatory or policy measure will violate NAFTA. At 
best, this guesswork is inefficient. Parties will spend time and money 
developing policy to protect the legitimate interests of their citizens 
without any a priori indication about the survivability of their efforts. 
At worst, Parties are left potentially exposed to costly dispute 
settlement proceedings with results that depend on Tribunal panelists’ 
subjective interpretation of the text.
116
  
Notwithstanding the uncertainty over what amounts to a nontariff 
barrier to trade, NAFTA includes two chapters through which the 
Parties’ can attempt to adopt measures—laws, regulations, 
procedures, requirements, or practices—that can impact trade.117 On 
 
 112. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 103. 
 113. Id. ch. 3, sections B and C. 
 114. Id. ch. 3, section B. See also Tariff Barrier, BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) 
(“A schedule or system of duties imposed by a government on imported or exported goods,”).  
 115. NAFTA, supra note 4, at ch. 3, section C. See also Nontariff Barrier, BLACKS LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“[A]n official policy, other than a tariff, that restricts international 
trade, especially by limiting imports or exports.”). 
 116. Odell, supra note 111, at 2. 
 117. NAFTA, supra note 4, chs. 7, 9. See also id. ch. 2 (“Measure includes any law, 
regulation, procedure, requirement or practice.”). Measures created under Chapter 7 and 
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their face, these carve-outs appear to give the Parties just the room 
they need to regulate against risk factors of obesity and other non-
communicable diseases. However, as discussed infra, these chapters 
are narrowly tailored and therefore are unlikely to give the Parties the 
requisite leeway needed to combat these multi-factored diseases.  
B. Chapter 7(B): Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Chapter Seven provides that member countries can “maintain or 
apply any sanitary or phytosanitary measure necessary for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health in its territory, 
including a measure more stringent than an international standard, 
guideline, or recommendation.”118 On its face, this explicit allowance 
for regulation for the sake of protecting human life or health in 
chapter seven seems as though it could help parties tackle non-
communicable disease. 
However, there are limits on this power.
119
 Measures created 
pursuant to this chapter must be based on adequate scientific 
principles, as demanded by Article 712(3), and they must be of the 
appropriate level of protection as determined by risk-assessment 
procedures detailed in Article 715.
120
  
 
Chapter 9 are both allowed but are subject to strict standards such as scientific principles and 
comprehensive risk assessments, discussed further infra Part IV. 
 118. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 712(1) (“Right to take sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures”). 
 119. Zamora, supra note 12, at 632. This chapter was included in NAFTA’s text to focus on 
the risks associated with animal and plant pests and diseases, food additives, food contaminants, 
and any other direct or indirect harm to humans, animals, and plants. See also NAFTA, supra 
note 4, ch. 7. 
 120. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 712(3). 
 3. Each Party shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure that it adopts, 
maintains or applies is: 
a) based on scientific principles, taking into account relevant factors including, 
where appropriate, different geographic conditions; 
b) not maintained where there is no longer a scientific basis for it; and 
c) based on a risk assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances. 
Id. NAFTA, supra note 4, ch. 7. 
1. In conducting a risk assessment, each Party shall take into account: 
a) relevant risk assessment techniques and methodologies developed by 
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These conditions have the potential to be especially limiting in 
proffering obesity countermeasures, as obesity and other non-
communicable diseases result from multiple factors that are a product 
of the sorts of foods available and an individual’s choice.121 Despite 
the extensive research available linking such factors to the obesity 
epidemic,
122
 these links are unlikely to meet the highly-technical 
scientific principles and risk-assessment procedures and standards 
required by Chapter Seven. It is this type of confining language that 
necessarily needs to be adjusted to properly address this pervasive 
 
international or North American standardizing organizations; 
b) relevant scientific evidence; 
c) relevant processes and production methods; 
d) relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; 
e) the prevalence of relevant diseases or pests, including the existence of pest-free 
or disease-free areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence; 
f) relevant ecological and other environmental conditions; and 
g) relevant treatments, such as quarantines. 
2. Further to paragraph 1, each Party shall, in establishing its appropriate level of 
protection regarding the risk associated with the introduction, establishment or spread 
of an animal or plant pest or disease, and in assessing the risk, also take into account 
the following economic factors, where relevant: 
a) loss of production or sales that may result from the pest or disease; 
b) costs of control or eradication of the pest or disease in its territory; and 
c) the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks. 
3. Each Party, in establishing its appropriate level of protection: 
a) should take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects; and 
b) shall, with the objective of achieving consistency in such levels, avoid arbitrary 
or unjustifiable distinctions in such levels in different circumstances, where such 
distinctions result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against a good of 
another Party or constitute a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties. 
Id.  
 
 121. See generally CDC, VITAL SIGNS: ADULT OBESITY (Aug. 2010), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/pdf/2010-08-vitalsigns.pdf (pointing to factors such as excess 
sugar in the diet, low levels of physical activity, and expense of quality food). See also C.K. 
Wells, Obesity as Malnutrition: The Role of Capitalism in the Obesity Global Epidemic, 24 
AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 261, 261 (2012). (“[O]besity develops from exposure to the ‘obesogenic 
niche,’ comprising diverse factors predisposing to weight gain.”). 
 122. See generally Wells, supra note 121.  
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and growing public health problem.
123
  
 
 123. See, e.g., Jimenez-Cruz & Bacardi-Gascon, supra note 10; Ketevan Rtveladze et al., 
Obesity Prevalence in Mexico: Impact on Health and Economic Burden, 17 PUB. HEALTH 
NUTRITION 233 (2013) (noting research exhibits on the rise in non-communicable disease in 
Mexico). 
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C. Chapter 9: Standards-Related Measures 
Similar in scope to Chapter Seven, Chapter Nine concerns the 
construction of nontechnical standards-related measures for, among 
other things, “the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 
the environment or consumers, and any measure to ensure its 
enforcement or implementation.”124  
As in Chapter Seven, there are limits to the Parties’ power to 
regulate pursuant to Chapter Nine. In particular, “no Party may 
prepare, adopt, maintain, or apply any standards-related measure with 
a view to or with the effect of creating an unnecessary obstacle to 
trade.”125 According to the treaty, an obstacle should not be deemed 
unnecessary where “the demonstrable purpose of the measure is to 
achieve a legitimate objective” and where “the measure does not 
operate to exclude goods of another Party that meet that legitimate 
objective.”126 In attempt to clarify this vague standard, NAFTA 
defers to the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (WTO 
TBT Agreement) to define the scope of barriers that are allowed by 
Chapter Nine:
127
  
[T]echnical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the 
risks non-fulfillment would create. Such legitimate objectives 
are, inter alia: . . . protection of human health or safety, animal 
or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such 
risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: 
available scientific and technical information . . . .
128
 
While Chapter Nine does at least appear to have more leeway than 
Chapter Seven in allowing governments to regulate for the sake of 
protecting human health, the vague language makes the outer 
 
 124. NAFTA, supra note 4, ch. 9 (“The scope of this chapter covers measures that may 
directly or indirectly affect trade in goods or services between Parties.”). 
 125. Id. art. 904(4).  
 126. Id. art. 904(4)(a)-(b). 
 127. Id. art. 903 (“[T]he Parties affirm with respect to each other their existing rights and 
obligations relating to standards-related measures under the GATT Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade and all other international agreements.”).  
  128. Technical Barriers to Trade: Technical Explanation, WTO.ORG, https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm (last accessed Apr. 17, 2016).  
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boundary of what is allowed under NAFTA and the WTO TBT 
Agreement largely unclear. This haziness conceivably complicates 
the regulatory process at the front end, as Parties determine how to 
allocate their regulatory efforts.  
With the hope of avoiding unnecessary trade disputes, WTO 
members meet three times each year, forming what is called the 
WTO Technical Barriers to Trade committee (TBT Committee).
129
 At 
these meetings, members may raise concerns about the legality of 
other members’ trade measures.130 Because NAFTA’s Chapter Nine 
is modeled after the WTO TBT Agreement,
131
 the TBT Committee’s 
reaction to a recent Chilean proposal is particularly relevant to our 
understanding of the challenges Mexico may face in the regulatory 
process.
132
 The proposed amendment would require certain categories 
of food to be labeled with a large “stop sign” to indicate to, and warn 
consumers of, the types of foods that are obesogenic.
133
 Despite 
Chile’s intention to “fight an epidemic of obesity,” members of the 
TBT Committee expressed concern that it would create unnecessary 
obstacles to trade.
134
  
The Chile proposal is but one of many “trade concerns”135 brought 
up at recent TBT committee meetings that attempt to address the 
obesity epidemic.
136
 How these trade concerns are dealt with at the 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. WTO 2015 News Items, WTO.ORG (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.wto.org/English/ 
news_e/news15_e/tbt_10nov15_e.htm. 
 131. Compare NAFTA, supra note 4, at ch. 9 with Uruguay Round Agreement: Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO.ORG, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-
tbt_e.htm (last accessed Apr. 17, 2016). 
 132. Members Discuss Guidelines for Trade-Friendly Regulation and Stop Sign for “Junk 
Food”, WTO.ORG (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.wto.org/English/news_e/news13_e/ 
tbt_13mar13_e.htm [hereinafter Members Discuss Guidelines] (“Pursuant to the amendment, 
certain categories of food would need to bear labels designated to inform and encourage 
consumers to avoid excessive intake which may lead to obesity and related non-communicable 
diseases.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. After a two-year process of notifying the WTO and member countries about the 
amendment, asking for feedback, etc., it was finally instituted in 2015. Modifica Descreto 
Supreme No. 977, de 1996, del Ministerio de Salud Reglamento Sanitario de Los Alimentos, 
Abr. 16, 2015 (Chile), available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/chilean-food-labeling-law-
2015.pdf.  
 135. See, e.g., Members Discuss Guidelines, supra note 132. 
 136. Record Number of New Trade Concerns Raised in Standards Committee in 2014, 
WTO.ORG (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/tbt_04nov14_e.htm. 
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WTO-level provides insight into how such measures would be treated 
if proffered by a NAFTA Party. However, NAFTA Parties are subject 
to an added burden that can impede regulatory efforts—broad and 
largely unrestrained deference to the tribunal in NAFTA investor-
state disputes is likely to add an extra layer of uncertainty to the 
regulatory process.  
V. PROPOSAL 
A. Amend NAFTA’s Language 
Despite the collaboration of Mexico, Canada, and the United 
States to create a comprehensive and favorable agreement for the 
people of North America, NAFTA has gridlocked the Parties in a 
powerless position to protect their respective citizens.  
What is lacking in NAFTA’s language is flexibility that would 
enable the parties to strike a balance between the private interests of 
free trade and foreign investment with public policy concerns.
137
 This 
Note proposes that it is necessary to revise some of the broad 
language of NAFTA to mitigate the effects of the many concerning 
outcomes the agreement has fostered since its ratification in 1994. 
The following provisions of the relevant portions of Chapters One, 
Seven, Nine, and Eleven include proposed changes that could 
assuage the negative effects of the agreement.  
Chapter One: Objectives 
Proposed Article 102(2). The Parties shall interpret and apply 
the provisions of this Agreement and provisions of measures 
taken in furtherance of this Agreement in light of the plain 
meaning of the text in accordance with the rules of 
interpretation set forth in Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention.
138
 
NAFTA provisions and measures created by the Parties that are in 
 
 137. Salazar, supra note 10, at 59.  
 138. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 102(2) (“The Parties shall interpret and apply the 
provisions of this Agreement in the light of its objectives set out in paragraph 1 and in 
accordance with applicable rules of international law.”). 
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conflict with NAFTA should be subject to the rules set forth in the 
Vienna Convention, which requires Tribunal panelists to rule based 
on the plain meaning of the text. At present, Tribunals are granted 
considerable discretion, the outer limits of which merely require the 
tribunal to make decisions based on the broadly-stated NAFTA goals 
in Article 102.
139
 Requiring the tribunal to engage in interpretive 
techniques that analyze the plain meaning alone will not only foster 
consistency amongst decisions, but also likely to restrict the NAFTA 
tribunal’s trend of ubiquitously holding for investor-corporations. 
This could also work to benefit the Parties as they develop regulatory 
and policy measures, since the NAFTA text will hold. It should be 
noted, however, in order for this sort of provision to work and 
provide the Parties with adequate notice, the NAFTA text as a whole 
will have to be tightened up such that key terms and standards are 
expressly defined. 
Chapter Seven: Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures 
Proposed Article 712(3). Each Party shall ensure that any 
sanitary or phytosanitary measure that it adopts, maintains, or 
applies is (a) based on scientific principles, taking into account 
relevant factors including, where appropriate, the transmission 
of non-communicable and/or multi-factored disease; and (b) 
based on a risk assessment, as appropriate to the 
circumstances and the relevant scientific and correlational 
understandings of the risk factor(s) as determined by the status 
of the disease as communicable or non-communicable.
140
 
Expanding the current language of Article 712 to include non-
communicable and multi-factored diseases will increase the ability of 
Parties to regulate beyond the strict bounds of the term ‘scientific 
principles.’ This change is important; while recent improvements in 
 
 139. Weiler, supra note 71, at 251. 
 140. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 712(3) (“Each Party shall ensure that any sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure that it adopts, maintains or applies is: a) based on scientific principles, 
taking into account relevant factors including, where appropriate, different geographic 
conditions; b) not maintained where there is no longer a scientific basis for it; and c) based on a 
risk assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances.”). 
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public health have decreased the mortality rate from infectious 
disease, doctors report a marked increase in the spread of non-
communicable disease, which typically result from a number of 
factors, not all of which are explicitly scientific.
141
 Considering the 
supposed relationship between NAFTA and non-communicable 
diseases, it is necessary that NAFTA reflect the contemporary 
categorization of non-communicable disease as an important public 
health issue.  
Proposed Article 724. Scientific basis means a reason based on 
reasonably reliable empirical, experimental, correlational, or 
other scientific data or information derived from using 
scientific methods.
142
 
The term ‘scientific basis’ implies the need for conclusive empirical 
data in support of a hypothesis. Obesity and other non-communicable 
diseases are complex conditions that result from a number of 
potential combinations,
143
 each of which does not necessarily have 
concrete empirical data to support the connection.
144
 By expanding 
the definition of scientific basis to include less-traditional types of 
scientific data collection, the Parties have increased flexibility to 
regulate non-communicable diseases.  
Chapter Nine: Standards-Related Measures 
Proposed Article 907(1). A Party may, in pursuing its 
legitimate objectives, conduct an assessment of risk. In 
conducting an assessment, a Party may take into account, 
among other factors relating to a good, class of goods, or 
service (a) available scientific evidence or technical 
information; and (b) in the case of a non-communicable or 
multi-factored disease, available correlational data that 
 
 141. See generally Zimmet, supra note 3.  
 142. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 723 (“[S]cientific basis means a reason based on data or 
information derived using scientific methods.”). 
 143. Mayo Clinic Staff, Obesity: Risk Factors, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/ 
diseases-conditions/obesity/basics/risk-factors/con-20014834 (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) 
(explaining that some common causes of obesity include genetics, family lifestyle, inactivity, 
and unhealthy eating and diet habits). See also Wells, supra note 121. 
 144. See generally Wells, supra note 121. 
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exhibits risk factors.
145
 
Similar to the proposed changes to Chapter Seven, expanding the 
definition of what constitutes a legitimate risk assessment under 
NAFTA is beneficial to Parties that wish to regulate non-
communicable diseases, which typically rely on correlational—rather 
than causal—scientific links.  
 
 145. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 907(1) (“A Party may, in pursuing its legitimate objectives, 
conduct an assessment of risk. In conducting an assessment, a Party may take into account, 
among other factors relating to a good or service: a) available scientific evidence or technical 
information; b) intended end uses; c) processes or production, operating, inspection, sampling 
or testing methods; or d) environmental conditions.”). 
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Chapter Eleven: Investment 
Proposed Article 1135(1). Where a Tribunal makes a final 
award against a Party, the Tribunal may award, reasonable 
monetary damages, equitable relief, or some combination 
thereof.
146
Where appropriate, the Tribunal shall require 
negotiations between the parties to ensure an outcome that 
balances the needs of the parties.  
The addition of equitable relief as a remedy under NAFTA could 
help control the availability of burdensome damage awards. It is 
unreasonable to require the Parties to pay significant amounts of 
money to corporations for implementing regulatory measures that are 
in the best interests of the public. This proposed section also grants 
the Tribunal authority to require negotiations between parties—in the 
course of a settlement or otherwise. Ideally, the Tribunal will 
mandate negotiations between the parties where the absence of a 
Party’s challenged measure is at odds with protecting the public.  
B. Changes at the WTO Level 
In 2013, the TBT Committee started to develop guidelines about 
how to regulate in a trade-friendly manner.
147
 The goal in setting 
these guidelines was to converge members’ regulatory efforts to both 
more effectively protect the public and provide predictability to 
businesses.
148
  
Coordinating this multinational effort should be a priority for the 
WTO, and should be adopted by the NAFTA parties, as there are 
many inter-governmental treaties that are difficult to interpret. In the 
NAFTA context, guidelines could be helpful as the Parties try to 
understand the extent of allowable regulatory action under the treaty. 
 
 146. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1135(1) (“Where a Tribunal makes a final award against a 
Party, the Tribunal may award, separately or in combination, only: a) monetary damages and 
any applicable interest; b) restitution of property, in which case the award shall provide that the 
disputing Party may pay monetary damages and any applicable interest in lieu of restitution.”). 
 147. Members Discuss Guidelines, supra note 132. See also WTO Secretariat, Decisions 
and Recommendations Adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade Since 1 
January 1995, G/TBT/1/Rev. 12 (June 9, 2011) (discussing generally the focus of the 
committee to reduce unnecessary barriers to trade). 
 148. Members Discuss Guidelines, supra note 132. 
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If adopted by the Parties to NAFTA, this set of guidelines would help 
clarify the ambiguities discussed in Part IV of this Note, and 
consequently, the Parties could proffer regulations to combat the 
spread of obesity.  
CONCLUSION 
The often American-borne non-communicable diseases such as 
obesity are spreading rapidly in an increasingly-global economy. In 
Mexico, the effect of globalization is amplified as a result of 
NAFTA. As such, the positive outcomes of NAFTA for the Parties 
must be viewed in light of the tight hold the treaty has over the 
Parties’ ability to regulate and the subsequent detriment to the 
Mexican public. This Note argues that this damage could be slowed, 
stopped, or even reversed, if the Parties renegotiated the 
fundamentally-flawed aspects of the treaty.  
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